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Abstract
The social/technology divide has eclipsed our understanding of the many ways in which
the two are interconnected. In this thesis I examine the interplay of the social and technological through the lens of embodiment. In particular, I focus on the ways in which
bodies become located, relocated and even dislocated, in interaction with technologies.
My approach is an analytical synthesis informed by three examinations: The art of
Mariko Mori; the ‘robot’ social media influencer @lilmiquela; and applications of artificial
intelligence on the human body. These examinations can be thought of as thought experiments, case studies or musings to help explore the possibilities for bodies rendered
through technologies. Through the complex interaction with technologies, embodiment
is affected and the question of where bodies begin and end becomes a productive way
to think about sociological processes of identity and power.
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“Metal is neither a thing nor an organism, but a body without organs.”1

“I have yet to hear of a robot dying of starvation, hypothermia or a broken heart.”2

“Who cyborgs will be is a radical question; the answers are a matter of survival.”3

“One way to read the history of technology is as a series of complexifications,
knots and loosening of the bonds and tensions between bodies and selves, mediated by technologies of communication, within a force field of power relationships. Over time, as technology has grown increasingly complex, and in particular with the development of information technology (which addresses itself overtly
rather than covertly to symbolic exchange), the role of technology in mediating
the flow of communication between bodies and selves has become more ubiquitous and more indispensable."4

1Félix Guattari and Gilles Deleuze, A Thousand Plateaus, 454.
2 Alison Adam, “Gender/Body/Machine,” 369.
3 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 12.
4 Sandy Stone, The War of Desire and Technology at the Close of the Mechanical Age, 86.
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1. Introduction to Technobodies
Roman poet Ovid tells the story of Pygmalion, a sculptor who lived alone and unmarried, yet intent on building his own ivory-girl because no such perfect woman existed in
the world for him. So enamored with one of his nude ivory feminine statues, he prayed
to the Gods to bring the stone to life. In the midst of consummation with the ivory-carved
body, the artifact begins to breathe. A translation of the tale reads:
and Pygmalion came back where the maiden lay, and lay beside her, and kissed
her, and she seemed to glow, and stroked her breast, and felt the ivory soften
under his fingers, as wax grows soft in sunshine, made pliable by handling. And
Pygmalion wonders, and doubts, is dubious and happy, plays lover again, and
over and over touches the body with his hand. It is a body! The veins throb under
the thumb. And oh, Pygmalion is lavish in his prayer and praise to Venus, no
words are good enough. The lips he kisses are real indeed, the ivory girl can feel
them, and blushes and responds, and the eyes open at once on lover and heaven, and Venus blesses the marriage she has made…5
Ava is the cyborg/robot/avatar/woman of the 2014 film Ex-Machina. Ava’s body is shiny
silver mesh, woven of thin metal cables but with the contour of breasts and the illusion
of the subtleties of steel flesh. Her face is young, white and feminine and protrudes like
a painting out of the cybernetic cable and wire body. Ava was also built by a sculptor like
Pygmalion, but he would more aptly be called a computer scientist. He too lived alone
and built women, for his own sexual pleasure and companionship, as well as his
technoscientific prowess. Ava and the ivory-girl have much in common, and both are
fictions.
The story of Pygmalion’s ivory-girl can be read as an illustration of early hybrids
between bodies and technology. It would be inchoate to presuppose that materials such
5

Humpries, “The Story of Pygmalion from Ovid's Metamorphoses.”
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as ivory and rock, or even wax, are vastly different than the copper and aluminum wires
and plastics that are used to build the modern and ubiquitous technologies. These raw
materials become fetishized within the ideologies, cultures and schematics that build
them into something that is only recognizable in situ. In their introduction to Material
Feminisms, Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman maintain that “we need a way to talk
about these bodies and the materiality they inhabit. Focusing exclusively on representations, ideology, and discourse excludes lived experience, corporeal practice, and biological substance from consideration.”6 Technobodies are bodies made possible by technological practices and technique. They are fusions, hybrids and assemblages between
matter. They are extrusive, tangible things but they are also miniaturized and intrusive.
They are visible and sometimes invisible. As I use this linguistic fusion, technobody
refers to the ways in which bodies are involved, made possible, imagined, ingrained or
otherwise imbricated within the webs of technological culture and society. Anne Balsamo defines the technological human as “a boundary figure belonging simultaneously
to at least two previously incompatible systems of meaning— ‘the organic/natural’ and
‘the technological/cultural’.”7 They are made of matter, elements and atoms as much as
they are endowed with characteristics of the cultural logic systems to which they belong.
Humans were once metaphorically likened to clocks [the wheels are turning] just as
bodies are now sometimes thought of in terms of computer-like traits of communication
and control [I am processing that]. The Western human body as explained by myth,
clockwork, engines, or cybernetics is a metaphorical dialectic wrapped up within the log-

6 Stacy Alaimo & Susan Heckman, “Introduction,” 1.
7 Anne Balsamo, “Forms of Technological Embodiment: Reading the Body in Contemporary Culture,” 215.
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ic of its time. This logic is inextricable from the technologies, just as technologies are
inextricable from culture and society.
The cyborg of today is the ivory-girl of yesterday. A cyborg is an assemblage between technologies and bodies, and could be understood as the hegemonic technobody. It can be located as concept the in corners of the literary world; the social sciences; as well as contemporary art beyond the discipline of computer science and cybernetics.
These portrayals have influenced my interest in the intersection of gender and
technology, and more specifically gender and artificial intelligence. The feminine and
humanistic figure of Ava in Ex Machina represents the idea of what can be classified
under general AI. That is, AI motivated to model human consciousness, to create machines that pass as humans, whose bodies look like our own, but are far more perfect.
General AI, as a project and phenomena, has been shaped by the cyber and
technoscapes of the cultural imagination. Rather than positioning general AI as a technological dream, this paper presupposes its grounding, both within a rich cultural imaginary and in situ of social scapes shaped by relations of power.
A primary focus of this thesis is the body, or its apparent absence. Interrogating,
exploring, questioning, and examining the role of the discursive body when and how it
exists can help us understand processes of reification or dissolution of identity-based
processes related to gender, race, and class. While humanistic figures personify the
possibilities of general AI, I will also focus on the ways in which gender and race have
been constructed within what is called ‘narrow AI’ systems, those that are programmed
to complete more singular tasks.
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While I challenge the false binary between narrow and general AI, this thesis
speaks to the appearance of these two poles, wherein technologies take part in bodymaking processes. Ava and Pygmalion’s ivory-girl stand at one end of the pole: they are
tangible and visual feats of material constructed into humanistic bodies, they are blueprints for technobodies. At the other end, the miniaturization and opacity of artificial intelligence, in tandem with machine learning, visualize bodies through their translation of
bodies and parts of bodies into information. Both render visibility of embodiment, but in
ways similar to the idea of a concave and convex mirror. Tangible techno bodies have
the quality of a convex mirror: they have an obtrusive and outward-curved characteristic
in that they have a very ‘physical’ presence, with their embodiment reflecting outside of
the mirror. Bodies rendered through miniaturized technologies take on the characteristics of a concave mirror: embodiment is achieved through an inward-curved and intrusive quality, wherein bodies are (re)formulated not in the open, but in the hollows. While
the obtrusive and magical cyborgian/general AI system largely remains a dream and
idea, the intrusive and miniaturized technologies are already commonly deployed, with
real consequences.
Through an examination of trends that exist in the liminal space between what is
cloistered to computer science or sociology or art, this essay will explore questions and
themes surrounding a sociology of technology. A discussion of these themes will arise in
relation to three case studies of techno bodies: the cyborg as imagined by artist Mariko
Mori, the virtual-marketing tool @lilmiquela, and finally a broad case study that explores
how artificial intelligence aided by machine-learning determines which bodies count or
‘pass’ as human. The boundaries between materiality and immateriality, fictional and
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realistic, imaginary and actual will be folded inside out through a curious approach that
seeks an understanding their mutual constitution. What I aim to offer is a unique sociological perspective and synthesis of my own academic engagement with this subject.
Mapping the junctures between the real and imaginary, and noting the discursive
power and role in the absence and presence of bodies is important to understanding
how the intersections of identity are interacting with the sociotechnical potential of technology as it was, is, and may be. This paper will examine both the convex and concave
appearance of bodies made real through technologies, noting that both are involved in
the production of human/machine hybrids, albeit in different ways. I will begin with a literature review that synthesizes the multifaceted cyborg tradition, theory on the body
and then center us in understanding how technologies are interacting with bodies in this
current moment. Then I will explore three cyborg case studies: the artwork of Mariko
Mori, the social media account @lilmiquela, and the case of machine learning. After
spotlighting these forms, I discuss the ways in which they all straddle the divide between technologies and bodies, endearingly referred to as technobodies.
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2. Literature Review: The Cyborg Tradition
This research began with a curiosity around the intersection of embodiment and technologies. Specifically, I wanted to explore the ways in which bodies become located, relocated and dislocated when embodiment and technology run into each other. I stumbled into these ideas after reading “A Cyborg Manifesto” by Donna Haraway. I was so
fascinated with Haraway’s amorphous and defiant cyborg, and especially effused with
the questions that this cyborg prods us towards: generally, what happens to selves and
identities when the body becomes unfamiliar? This research synthesizes a wide swath
of knowledge relating to the convergence between technology/bodies (technobodies)
from a variety of disciplines. I begin with “A Cyborg Manifesto,” introducing this
metaphorical approach to cyborgs and its seminal approach to picking apart boundaries. This essay is a way, or tool, of imagining beyond the taken for granted overgrowth
that has shaded recognition of subjectivities, identities and ontologies that hold apart the
interactions between humans and machines in an increasingly ubiquitous technological
world. With a working idea of Haraway’s amorphous blueprint of the cyborg, I purvey the
literature that discusses other representations of cyborgian bodies throughout time,
space and across bounded disciplines. In order to explore the cyborg, as a hybrid between incompatible entities, I theoretically ground embodiment in literature that speaks
to its sociocultural production. Finally, I turn towards literature that critically examines
technologies of artificial intelligence and human-computer interaction through sociocultural lenses, discussing their sociocultural production and the ways in which they reify
what is considered normal.
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>The Cyborg in the Integrated Circuit
In 1985, Donna Haraway published her essay “A Cyborg Manifesto” which she describes as “an ironic dream of a common language for women in the integrated circuit.”8
The cyborg is the central actor and unit of analysis, loosely defined as “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction.”9 The essay outlines Haraway’s vision of a cyborg as a metaphor through
which she explores the possibility of breaking boundaries familiar to Western thought.
Haraway maps three breakdowns in particular, all related to embodiment. First, she discusses the dissolving of borders demarcating the difference between human and animal. Second, Haraway draws attention to another boundary between human(:animal)
and machine. She ponders this distinction, writing that “late twentieth-century machines
have made thoroughly ambiguous the difference between natural and artificial, mind
and body, self-developing and externally designed, and many other distinctions that
used to apply to organisms and machines. Our machines are disturbingly lively, and we
ourselves frighteningly inert.”10 Extending from the breakdown of the human/animal/machine distinctions comes Haraway’s third focus, which is the porous boundary between
physical and nonphysical.
Donna Haraway’s cyborg resists definition. You cannot locate it. As a socialistfeminist, and one devoted to the interconnectedness of things, Haraway crafts the oncepopular idea of the cyborg as a resource to reimagine and breakout of postmodernism,

8 Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 3.
9 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 3-4.
10 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 11.
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non-naturalism, and the reifying qualities of Western philosophy and thought that appeared to have calcified. She maintains that “the cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our
politics.”11 Haraway contends that the fatalism of Western hegemony and ideology
stems in large part from its cosmology, its creation-stories that theorized a primary unity;
ie. once everything was still and one. The cyborg as an ontology is not privy to Western
myths, because it was never whole, rather it was built from parts. The idea that “the cyborg would not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream
of returning to dust12” is how the cyborg becomes the medium to explore the breakdown
of the Western boundaries that demarcate the limits of our imagination. Haraway contends that: “The cyborg is a condensed image of both imagination and material reality,
the two joined centres structuring any possibility of historical transformation. In the traditions of 'Western' science and politics — the tradition of racist, male-dominant capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for
the productions of culture; the tradition of reproduction of the self from the reflections of
the other — the relation between organism and machine has been a border war.”13
The imagery of Haraway’s ironic and blasphemous cyborg is a powerful resource
to rethink the essentialized and static notions of bodies. The cyborg is embodied and
material, but not essentialized in its body. If, as Sherry Ortner has contentiously written,
woman is to nature as man is to culture14; then the cyborg defaces this dichotomous

11 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 7.
12 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 9.
13 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 7.
14 Sherry Ortner, “Is Female to Male as Nature Is to Culture?”
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linkage. She emphasizes that “cyborg imagery can suggest a way out of the maze of
dualisms in which we have explained our bodies and our tools to ourselves. This is not
a dream of a common language, but of a powerful infidel heteroglossia. It is an imagination of a feminist speaking in tongues to strike fear into the circuits of the super savers
of the new right. It means both building and destroying machines, identities, categories,
relationships, space stories.”15
Haraway does not specifically elaborate upon the cyborg body, but maintains that
it is characterized by its multiplicity, partial identities and its location as the site of a
boundary war. Haraway melds pertinent cyborg and sci-fi imagery in this discussion, in
part to illustrate that where our bodies begin and end is a question that has to do with
power: “Who cyborgs will be is a radical question; the answers are a matter of
survival.”16

>The Haunted Technological Body
Terms related to technobodies and technoworlds are slippery at best. It seems
difficult to draw limits between what counts as automata and cyborg, the difference between inspirited technological bodies of today and of yesterday. I think haunting is a
useful framework to understand the assemblages of techno-bodies. The sociologist Avery Gordon describes that “haunting raises specters, and it alters the experience of being in linear time, alters the way we normally separate and sequence the past, the
present and the future. These specters or ghosts appear when the trouble they repre-

15 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 68.
16 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 12.
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sent and symptomize is no longer being contained or repressed or blocked from view.”17
Gordon’s concept of haunting breaks down notions of progress in its blatant disregard
for the linearity of time, with haunting being the outcroppings of remembrance of things
past. Haunting, when applied to techno-bodies, can elucidate a strange scene in the
1982 film Blade Runner, wherein the human-like replicant Pris hides herself under a
translucent sheet amongst a scene of moving and rattling puppets and automata, clearly more archaic but arguably just as hybrid. As the protagonist Deckard enters the room
looking for Pris, there is an overlap of different formulations of technological bodies, an
assemblage of human selves all coexisting in one frame. What is the trouble then?
Why do automata, puppets, cyborgs, and bodies made through AI exist in the same
plane, why are they all here now? Gordon clarifies: “We’re haunted, as Herbert Marcuse
wrote, by the ‘historic alternatives’ that could have been and by the peculiar temporality
of the shadowing of lost and better futures that insinuates itself in the something-to-bedone, sometimes as nostalgia, sometimes as regret, sometimes as a kind of critical urgency.”18 Focusing on the vast assemblages of techno-bodies, located by their similarities in being hybrids of bodies and technology, allows us to note the historic alternatives
and the futuristic possibilities and parallels that illustrate the local context of their formulations. Focusing on haunting is a way to note the specificities of the intersection between body/technology that has become ubiquitous and taken for granted.
Though the imagery built around the cyborg is deeply and specifically embedded within contemporary Western iconography pertaining to its technological

17 Avery Gordon, “Some Thoughts on Haunting and Futurity,” 2.
18 Avery Gordon, “Some Thoughts on Haunting and Futurity,” 7.
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innovations, the idea of a human/machine hybrid has a long history. In Gods and
Monsters, Adrienne Mayor combs through the histories of antiquities endowed
with mental qualities, resurfacing the human/machine of Greek mythology and
ancient-India. Mayor resurrects the typology uniting the grouping of “android, robot, automaton, puppet, AI, machine, cyborg” as things that are made, not born.19
Mayor does not seek to connect the dots in such a linear fashion as to suggest
the influences of these hybrids of the past. In her words: “Even though the examples of animated statues, self-moving objects, and simulacra of nature imagined
in myths, legends, and other ancient accounts are not exactly machines, robots,
or AI in the modern sense, I believe that the stories collected here are ‘good to
think with,’ tracing the nascent concepts and imaginings about artificial life that
preceded technological actualities.”20 Similarly, Franchi and Güzeldere outline
early automata, noting that “the emphasis was only on the imitation of behavior,
not on the workings of the internal mechanisms that drive the behavior and could,
in principle, imbue it with intelligence and autonomy”21 This mimetic focus is illustrated by the automata of the Islamic civilizations dating back to the ninth century,
specifically those built by al-Jazari, who “engineered dozens of automata, from
solely functional water-raising devices and clocks to those with high entertainment value, such as peacocks, a self-replenishing vessel, an orchestra of musi-

19 Adrienne Mayor, “Introduction,” 3.
20 Adrienne Mayor, “Introduction,” 4.
21 Stefano Franchi & Güven Güzeldere, “Machinations of the Mind,” 27.
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cians, a scribe, a slave, and a wine-servant.”22 Kate Crawford writes about another technology of the past called the statua citofonica —talking statue —created by a Jesuit intellectual named Athanasius Kircher:
The listening system could eavesdrop on everyday conversations in
the piazza, and relay them to the 17th century Italian oligarchs. Kircher’s
talking statue was an early form of information extraction for the elites –
people talking in the street would have no indication that their conversations were being funneled to those who would instrument that knowledge
for their own power, entertainment and wealth. People inside the homes of
aristocrats would have no idea how a magical statue was speaking and
conveying all manner of information. The aim was to obscure how the system worked: an elegant statue was all they could see. Listening systems,
even at this early stage, were about power, class, and secrecy.23

Featherstone and Burrows examine Gibsonian sci-fi and its protege themes of
cyborgs, cyberpunk, and cyberspace. The author William Gibson is widely understood
to be the creator of the so-called ‘cyberpunk’ world, a term developed alongside his
work and sci-fi aesthetic in the early eighties. Featherstone and Burrows bring life to this
idea of what cyberpunk is: “It sketches out the dark side of the technological-fix visions
of the future, with a wide range of post-human forms which have both theoretical and
practical implications.”24 Steampunk is to industrial technological innovations as cyberpunk is to cybernetic innovations of the twentieth century. Examining the media surrounding cyberpunk imagery (Blade Runner, Robocop, Terminator to name a few), facilitates the message that: “Cyberpunk and sociological analyses which draw upon it have
a ‘habit’ of ‘folding into’ each other in a recursive relation between the fictional and the

22 Stefano Franchi & Güven Güzeldere, “Machinations of the Mind,” 29.
23 Crawford, “Anatomy of an AI System.”
24 Featherstone & Brown, “Cultures of Technological Embodiment,” 3.
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analytic which might be described as an instance of a hyperreal positive feedback
loop.”25 The cyborg is a figure that lives and breathes in cyberpunk worlds of fiction. For
example, Rachael is a replicant, or a bioengineered being in the cyberpunk sci-fi film
Blade Runner. For these scholars, sci-fi as contemporary lore is in dialectic with prefigurative social theory.
The idea of the cyborg in contemporary thought lives within the convergence of
artificial intelligence and cybernetics. In “Feedback and Cybernetics,” David Tomas examines a historical typology of automata written by Norbert Wiener, founder of the field
of cybernetics. Wiener divided tech bodies into four periods: “a mythic Golemic age; the
age of clocks (17th and 18th centuries); the age of steam, originator of the governor
mechanism itself (late 18th and 19th centuries)’ and finally, the age of communication
and control, an age marked by a shift from power engineering to communication engineering…(Wiener, 1948a;51, 50).”26 Wiener further articulates that these four periods
correlate with models for understanding the human body. Quoting Tomas, these formulations are: “the body as a malleable, magical, clay figure; the body as a clockwork
mechanism; the body as a ‘glorified heat engine, burning some combustible fuel instead
of the glycogen of the human muscles and most recently, the body as an electronic system (Wiener, 1948a; 51).”27 These summations echo the idea that the differences between automata, puppets, statues and cyborgs are birthed out of the dialectic between
body/machine. As machines shift, philosophies of the body contort with new eruptions
out of science and technology. Cybernetics is a paradigm shift that encompasses trans25 Featherstone & Brown, “Cultures of Technological Embodiment,” 9.
26 Tomas, “Feedback and CyberneAcs,” 23.
27

Ibid.
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formations in science and technology as well as philosophies and theories on the body.
Body becomes a template for the machine and the machine becomes a model of the
body. Tomas defines cybernetics as “a new science of communications and control...a
science that proposed a completely new vision of the human body, its relationship to the
organic world and the world of machines.”28 Tomas quotes Wiener’s articulation of what
this looks like: “For all these forms of behavior, and particularly for the more complicated
ones, we must have the central decision organs which determine what the machine is to
do next on the basis of information fed back to it, which it stores by means analogous to
the memory of a living organism (Wiener, 1954: 32-3).”29 The dialectic between body/
machine that comes out of cybernetics is an abstraction, wherein machines are modeled off of what are considered to be the most fundamental necessities in bodies needed to sustain a self-regulating organism.
Much in this vein, the term “cyborg” tumbled out as a concept for the first time
during the 1960s US space project. David Thomas examines the term’s first appearance
in an article in Astronautics, written by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline titled “Cyborgs
and Space.” He clarifies: “at that time, the idea of creating a cyborg, or cybernetic organism, through a modification of the human body was geared to the problem of human
adaptation to hostile environments in connection with extraterrestrial space travel.”30
Tomas’ approach to understanding the conception of the cyborg is to raise the specter
of its initial parameters, which were attuned to its utilitarian calling towards outer space.

28 Tomas, “Feedback and CyberneAcs,” 25.
29

Ibid.

30 Tomas, “From the Cyborg to Posthuman Space,” 85.
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The cyborg was a specific solution to a defined problem, that was inextricably linked to
a cultural context defined by its fascination with the man in space. Tomas quotes Clynes
and Kline writing on the consolidation of the cyborg around these givens: “For the exogenously extended organization complex functioning as an integrated homeostatic
system unconsciously, we propose the term ‘Cyborg.’ The cyborg deliberately incorporates exogenous components extending the self-regulatory control function of the organism in order to adapt it to new environments.”31 This definition of the cyborg was
born under the constraints and within the context of the space problem, as a solution to
the difficulties of space travel. Tomas highlights that “the cyborg concept embodied a
specific context, cultural logic, type of formal articulation, and dualistic fields of operation: adaptation to a hostile environment, homeostasis; self-regulating man-machine
systems, and automatic/unconscious vs. conscious activity.”32 But in order to be articulated through this specific logic system, the groundwork of cybernetics—that linked
body/machine—had to be laid.
One can look at the cyborg tradition as a line of progress {statues→ automata→
cybernetic organisms} wherein each becomes more complex, moving from pure mimetic
function to automatic and strategic control. However, this would be to place these formulations outside of history, to fragment that entanglement between all of these forms.
It would also be mistaken to disregard the ways in which they are materializations of
specific sociocultural systems of logic, or ways of knowing. Looking at the cyborg tradition outside of a taxonomy is important because it holds current body/machine hybrids,

31 Tomas, “From the Cyborg to Posthuman Space,” 86.
32 Ibid.
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or technobodies, accountable to the logic that constructs them, and in turn the logic that
they reify. Refusing notions of progress and history as past, relocating embodiment in
technology as an expansive contest of body-making allows us to note that exactly how
bodies and machines are defined is always a project of power. Scrutinizing these assemblages of technobodies allows us to understand how power comes to shape imagination into materialization and also to note the parallel imaginings or longings for representation in this body/machine-making project.

>The Body
This work is rooted in theory that maintains that there is no universal or natural
body prior to the discourse that constructs it. Judith Butler urges that “the body gains
meaning within discourse only in the context of power relations.”33 Sociologist Jodi
O’Brien maintains that “our bodies are not entirely pre-formed, but develop in relation to
socio-developmental categories, processes, and experiences.”34
Identity categories like gender and race have been primary ways of knowing bodies, categorizing bodies, and rendering them meaningful within socioscapes rife with hierarchies. Contemporary gender scholars agree that there is no natural body. Identity
categories of race and gender do not exist within us, rather they are ascribed unto us.
Gender and race are understood to be sociocultural constructions that give meaning to
bodies through processes of categorization. Furthermore, gender and race are reified
through ideologies that position them as natural and essential.

33 Buter, Gender Trouble, 117.
34 O’Brien, “Introduction,” 5.
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While the gendered body is often thought to be a cultural interpretation of biological sex difference, Anne Fausto-Sterling challenges the Western binary notion that there
are only two sexes, complicating the gender binary by maintaining the idea that sex is
also socioculturally constructed. She writes that “male and female, masculine and feminine, cannot be parsed as some kind of continuum. Rather, sex and gender are best
conceptualized as points in a multidimensional space. For some time, experts on gender development have distinguished between sex at the genetic level and at the cellular
level (sex-specific gene expression, X and Y chromosomes); at the hormonal level (in
the fetus, during childhood and after puberty); and at the anatomical level (genitals and
secondary sexual characteristics). Gender identity presumably emerges from all of
those corporeal aspects via some poorly understood interaction with environment and
experience.”35
In “Where is gender?” Jodi O’Brien writes that “gender and sexuality scholars
have successfully critiqued the notion of natural gender roles and identities by pointing
out that most of the behaviors associated with these identities and roles are culturally
specific and socially constructed.”36 However, O’Brien warns that the belief that there is
a natural body is one that feeds back into the (re)production of binary thinking. They
write: “In answer to the question where is gender? The sociologist would reply it’s in our
bodies, minds, and social interactions, but specifically in the gender scripts we have for
making sense of our bodies, our feelings and actions, our relationships with others, and

35 Fausto-Sterling, “Five Sexes Revisited,” 20.
36 O’Brien, 3.
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society.”37 These scholars locate the body as an important site of discursive meaning.
To say that there is no natural body is not to negate the physicality of the body. Of
course, I am an embodied being writing just as you are an embodied being reading.
The absence of a natural body is connected to the idea of representationalism.
Representationalism has hinged on the faith that there is a referent, or a subject behind
the representation. This is the idea that our bodies are carriers of signs that can be
read. There is a sociocultural legibility to markers as well as how we perform them. In
her essay, “Posthuman Performativity”, Karen Barad explores how matter comes to matter. She urges us that “it is possible to develop coherent philosophical positions that
deny that there are representations on one hand and ontological separate entities awaiting representation on the other. A performative understanding, which shifts the focus
from linguistic representations to discursive practices, is one such alternative.”38 Karen
Barad presents a reformulation of the performativity of materiality, describing that: “All
bodies, not merely “human” bodies, come to matter through the world’s iterative intraactivity—its performativity. This is true not only of the surface or contours of the body but
also of the body in the fullness of its physicality, including the very “atoms” of its being.
Bodies are not objects with inherent boundaries and properties; they are material-discursive phenomena.”39 In Barad’s articulation, the body is never something that can be
pinned down out of its metaphysical de facto naturality. It does not exist a priori. Rather,
it is something that is always in a state of becoming. She maintains: “‘Human bodies’

37 O’Brien, 4.
38 Barad, “Posthuman Performativity,” 126.
39 Barad, 141.
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and ‘human subjects’ do not preexist as such; nor are they mere end products. ‘Humans’ are neither pure cause nor pure effect, but part of the world in its open-ended becoming.”40
This makes particular sense when theorized in context of Foucault’s attention to
the historical formulations of the power in constructions of subjectivity and identity. Foucault discusses representationalism, for example, in his exploration of the construction
of subjects of sexuality. In describing his project in The History of Sexuality, Foucault
maintains:
The purpose of the present study is in fact to show how deployments of power
are directly connected to the body – to bodies, functions, physiological processes, sensations, and pleasures; far from the body having to be effaced, what is
needed is to make it visible through an analysis in which the biological and the
historical are not consecutive to one another … but are bound together in an increasingly complex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern
technologies of power that take life as their objective. Hence I do not envisage a
“history of mentalities” that would take account of bodies only through the manner in which they have been perceived and given meaning and value; but a “history of bodies” and the manner in which what is most material and most vital in
them has been invested.41
In Technologies of the Gendered Body, Anne Balsamo explores the Foucauldian
current of reading the discursive body, albeit drawing heavily from feminist scholarship.
She describes: “Michel Foucault is not much interested in the truth of the body as he is
in elaborating the apparatus that produces truth effects at the level of the body. His concern is to describe the discursive systems that produce serious truth claims about bodies.”42 Clarifying the idea of apparatus: “Foucault suggests the term ‘apparatus’ and lat40 Barad, 139.
41 Foucault, “History of Sexuality,” 151-152.
42 Balsamo, “Technologies of the Gendered Body,” 20.
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er “technology” to name the process of connection between discursive practices, institutional relations, and material effects that, working together, produce a meaning or a
“truth effect” for the human body...Technology names the process whereby discursive
practices work interdependently with other cultural forces to produce effects at the level
of the body.”43 She discusses how Foucault, in his attempt to deconstruct the “natural”
body, reified the language of essentialism surrounding the construction of the feminine
subject in The History of Sexuality. Balsamo quotes Susan Suleiman’s rebuke of Foucault’s omission of gender which reads: “The cultural significance of the female body is
not only (not even first and foremost) that of a flesh-and-blood entity, but that of a symbolic construct. Everything we know about the body—certainly as regards the past, and
even, it could be argued, as regards the present—exists for us in some form of discourse: and discourse, whether verbal or visual, fictive or historical or speculative, is
never unmediated, never free of interpretation, ever innocent."44
The key point that Balsamo makes concerning the work of Suleiman is that these
discursive meanings are not neutral, but carry the power to inform and mediate a representation. This is summarized: “While it is true, as Suleiman says, that ‘everything we
know about the body...exists for us in some form of discourse,’ this discourse is not entirely divorced from the material manifestation of the flesh and blood identity.”45
Though the meaning relates to what exists physically, and in nature, this meaning
is not naturally determined. She writes, “To claim that the body is a discursive construc-

43 Balsamo, “Technologies of the Gendered Body,” 20-21.
44 Balsamo, 23.
45 Ibid.
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tion, and therefore can be read, already effects a deconstruction of its natural posture.
Such is the first act of thick perception.”46 If the human body can be located in a specific moment in time, it is only because boundaries have been drawn and defined. Barad’s
“post-humanist account calls into question the givenness of the differential categories of
‘human’ and ‘nonhuman,’ examining the practices through which these differential
boundaries are stabilized and destabilized. Donna Haraway’s scholarly opus—from primates to cyborgs to companion species—epitomizes this point.”47
Thus to say that there is no natural body is to dissent from Western knowledge
making that is rooted in drawing boundaries around what can then be understood as
‘representational’ entities to look at. If we consider for a minute that there is no actual
natural body, that there is no referent behind what we are talking about, we can suspend the essentialism of the body and the essentialism of gender and race. We can
suspend where we suppose the body begins and ends, which is usually at the flesh. We
can consider that bodies might begin and end in different places and moments in space
and time. In other words, the body is beyond the flesh.

>The Technobody of Today
The first section explored the dialectic between body and machine—the technobody— through an exploration of the cyborg tradition. I noted some of the ways in which
technological transformations are involved in a feedback loop wherein the body becomes redefined. The second section highlighted the theoretical foundation through

46 Balsamo, 20.
47 Balsamo, 126.
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which scholars of the body examine it as a sociocultural production. Through the literature, this section addresses the question what happens when the body and technology
run into each other? Largely, the answer is that the body becomes (re)located when it
runs into technologies. This section will focus on the way that this (re)location is an expression of power, wherein an idea of ‘normal’ embodiment is reified.
Bruno Latour writes on power relations through assemblages in his piece “Technology is society made durable.” He focuses on the ways in which power is folded into
the lifecycle of technologies, from their inception to their materializations. Rather than
viewing power and domination only through a perspective on social relations, Latour
suggests that we must also imbricate non-human actors within this web. In this essay,
Latour lays the foundation for a new way of treating power and domination through network analysis. He suggests looking within the dynamism of the network for socio-technical relations, rather than the stable exterior, for explanation. Latour highlights that,
“domination is visible only at the end of the story. At many other steps in the story the
innovation was highly flexible, negotiable, at the mercy of a contingent event. It is this
variation that makes technology such an enigma for social theory.”48 In other words, the
innovation moves from translucence to opacity. He writes that “domination is never a
capital that can be stored in a bank. It has to be deployed, black-box, repaired, maintained.”49 The black box concept is one that can be understood as the ossification of social relations rooted in power; it is the hardening of power in the production of technologies. Latour defines it as “the way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its

48 Latour, “Technology is Society Made Durable,” 113.
49 Latour, “Technology is Society Made Durable,” 118.
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own success” highlighting that “paradoxically, the more science and technology succeed, the more opaque and obscure they become.”50 To understand technological innovations with Latour’s actor-network theory is to understand that technologies build off of
one another, recede and proceed outside of conventional notions of linearity. It is to
leave room for the haunting of technologies of past and present. In a similar vein, John
Law pushes against the idea of a singularity of power relations. He maintains that
the network of what we call 'social' relations is never purely social. For, though it
is social, it is also and simultaneously technical, architectural, textual, and natural. Indeed, the division between such categories is itself a relational achievement
rather than something given in the order of things. Thus to understand the social
and, more particularly, to understand what it is that stabilizes social relations to
generate power effects we have, I suggest, to make sense of the way in which
the 'social' interacts with and is constituted by these other materials. And, in particular, we have to explore the way in which discursive ordering strategies (in
part) shape, and are embodied in a range of different materials.51
What Law writes about is the ontological separation of categories as itself, an expression of power, urging as Latour does, that we must look across networks to understand
power.
Judy Wacjman also comments on this idea that power resurfaces continually,
stressing the need to view technologies in a continuum, rather than distinguishing newer
technologies from older ones. This constructivist perspective on technology offers a
check-in for the technological deterministic perspective of past and future technologies.
Technological determinism positions technology as “an external, autonomous force exerting an influence on society”52 in such a way that interrogation and negotiation of

50 Latour, “Pandora’s Box,” p. 304.
51 John Law, “On Power and it’s Tactics,” 166.
52 Wacjman, Technofeminism, 33.
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technology does not necessarily follow. Social scientists studying technology wanted to
challenge the technological determinism that had shaped the hegemonic understanding
of technology. Wacjman highlights key components of the sociology of technology as
understanding technology as a system that “builds on previous technology” and “the result of ‘heterogeneous engineering'’” wherein the technical dimension of technology is
never simply technical but social, cultural, economic and political.53 STS positions technology as a sociotechnical product, shaped by context and tied to history. She maintains
that “the social studies of technology emphasize that it is not necessarily technical efficiency, but rather the contingencies of sociotechnical circumstances and the play of institutional interests that favor one technology over another.''54 However, Wacjman critiques actor-network theory for its lack of attention to gender and thus its reification of
masculinity as the invisible center. Wacjman writes that, “by bracketing issues of sexual
difference and inequality, mainstream technology studies fail to explore how technologies operate as a site for the production of gendered knowledge and knowledge of gender.”55
Judy Wacjman writes more on the intersection of gender and technology in “Feminist Theories of Technology” through an unpacking of the various ways feminisms have
understood technology. Though these feminist schemas differ on key points in relation
to the intersection of gender and technology, they all work to shift a perspective in how
technology is understood. Technology was seen as socially shaped, but shaped by men

53 Wacjman, Technofeminism, 34-35.
54 Wacjman, Technofeminism, 36.
55 Wajcman, Technofeminism 45.
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to the exclusion of women. While this literature did reflect an understanding of the historical variability and plurality of the categories of ‘women’ and ‘technology’, it was nevertheless pessimistic about the possibilities of designing technologies for gender equality.”56 The nineties marked a turn away from this pessimism towards the possibility for
cyberspace to blur the conflation between the body and gender. Cyberfeminists and the
work of Donna Haraway live in this paradigm.57 Haraway’s “A Cyborg Manifesto” was a
precursor to the challenge of the pessimism of second-wave feminists in their approach
to technology as a dead-end patriarchal reification, however this piece has been criticized for its apparently unwavering acceptance of technology and its possibilities. Wajcman reformulates these two poles by demarcating that in order “to move forward, we
need to understand that technology as such is neither inherently patriarchal nor unambiguously liberating.”
Wajcman maintains that there is a mutual-construction of technology and gender.
A social constructivist framework guiding the understanding of technology means that
“gender relations can be thought of as materialized in technology, and masculinity and
femininity in turn acquire their meaning and character through their enrollment and embeddedness in working machines.”58 This framework guides the whole lifecycle of a sociotechnical product from its conception to its social reality as a process wherein gender
is shaping and in turn, being shaped. Technology, thus existing in a gendered world, is
inherently gendered and will in turn work on gender. As gender was reworked and un-

56 Wajcman, “Feminist Theories of Technology,” 147.
57 Ibid.
58 Wajcman, “Feminist Theories of Technology,” 149.
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derstood to be fluid and performative, not rooted in any essentialist account of the body,
the view came to be that that “both technology and gender are products of a moving relational process” and that “gendered conceptions of users are fluid, and that the same
artifact is subject to a variety of interpretations and meanings.”59 Wajcman maintains
that “the result is more nuanced feminist research that captures the increasingly complex intertwining of gender and technoscience as an ongoing process of mutual shaping
over time and across multiple sites.”60 In conclusion, Wajcman highlights the necessity
to engage with technology for its capacity to negotiate gender relations. She writes that
feminism and STS both “foreground the ways that people and artifacts co-evolve, reminding us that things could be otherwise, that technologies are not the inevitable result
of the application of scientific and technological knowledge.”61 To understand technology
from a social constructivist framework is to see it as evolving and malleable rather than
deterministic and immutable. She concludes this piece by highlighting that “we live in a
technological culture, a society that is constituted by science and technology, and so the
politics of technology is integral to the renegotiation of gender power relations.”62
While Latour and Law discuss the interaction of power within technologies, Wajcman complicates their gender-neutral perspective through her feminist approach. Alison Adam takes a more grounded approach to discussing the implications that a gender-neutral perspective has cascaded, particularly in the early foundations of the field of
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artificial intelligence. In “Gender/Body/Machine” Alison Adam takes a grounded epistemological approach to looks for the root of why the body is seemingly vacant in the production of what is considered to be knowledge. The roots of why the body is voided in
what is considered to be knowledge is wrapped up in Cartesian philosophy, which
presents a dichotomy between mind and body and by proxy reifies difference between
masculine and feminine. Adam argues that the knowledge that is (re)produced is a gendered knowledge, defined by centering and privileging masculine experiences. This
view solidified into what philosopher Genieve Lloyd calls the “man of reason” which
rests on the association of masculinity with intelligence and rationality. She notes that
“in particular such a view elevates mental knowledge over corporeal knowledge; the
former is often associated with a masculine form of reasoning while the latter is largely
associated with the feminine.”63 The man/woman binary thus works in tandem with the
binary of mind/body. As Derrida has written, duality implies hierarchy wherein “one of
the two terms governs the other.”64 If knowledge is predicated on a series of dichotomies with a common juncture of masculine/feminine then it rests that knowledge
has been constructed out of notions of masculinity. And if knowledge has been defined
around these taken for granted conflations and notions that are inherently gendered,
then it is no small leap to say that these ideas have been operationalized in projects that
attempt to build intelligence. In the words of Adam “it is no surprise that propositional
knowledge has found a voice as the pinnacle of true knowledge, and indeed no surprise

63 Adam, “ConstrucAons of Gender in the History of ArAﬁcial Intelligence,” 47.
64 Derrida, Positions, 41.
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that large and prestigious projects in artificial intelligence are based on such a Cartesian
view of reason.”65
To say that knowledge in symbolic AI has a gender is to acknowledge standpoint
theory and the legacy of feminist epistemology that challenges the traditional sciences.
It lies on the premise that it is important to examine “who the ideal knower is taken to
be” and “what can be known.”66 Following the philosopher Lorraine Code, Adams emphasizes that there has been a lack of visibility around standpoint and the illusion of a
perspective less subject, “a view from nowhere.”67 This view from nowhere has been
challenged by feminists for its role in gender domination of knowledge, because this objective and perspective less viewer of knowledge is cast in a masculine ideal. Adams
discusses the second aspect of epistemological concerns over what gets to be knowledge. Often, she argues, traditional epistemologies prioritize propositional knowledge,
which is the knowledge of knowing that. This is different, however, than knowing how
and this propositional knowledge is viewed as superior.68 Important to note is that knowing that knowledge is associated with the masculine sphere while knowing how knowledge, or corporeal knowledge, is often associated with the feminine sphere. Viewing
propositional knowledge as more important than corporeal knowledge, and more often
not even viewing corporeal knowledge as knowledge has led to what Adams calls epistemic discrimination.

65 Adam, “Gender/Body/Machine,” 363.
66 Adam, “ConstrucAons of Gender in the History of ArAﬁcial Intelligence,” 48.
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Adams examines early symbolic AI systems: Logic Theorist, General Problem
Solver (GPS) and Cyc. Adams explains that the early history of AI began in the
mid-1950s wherein the boundaries and quandaries of the field were constructed. At this
moment, there was open possibility for the field and its constructors landed on the track
of this Western philosophy of ‘The Man of Reason.’ Adams explains that this choice set
the tone for the type of work that was to be done in symbolic AI for the next three or
more decades. This style was that mental reason dominates bodily reason and that
mental reason is the rational and the body, something to transcend and thus non-rational. The exclusion of femininity set the gender domination of knowledge in symbolic AI.
Adams offers us a very telling depiction of these early AI researchers, quoting Wilensky
(Adams quoting Athanasiou [18] quoting Wilensky): “They were interested in intelligence, and they needed somewhere to start. So they looked around at who the
smartest people were, and they were themselves, of course. They were all essentially
mathematicians by training, and mathematicians do two things-they prove theorems and
they play chess. And they said, hey, if it proves a theorem or plays chess, it must be
smart.”69
We see this duality and domination in Logic Theorist, an AI program constructed
around three mastery tasks: chess, geometry, and logic theorem proving. The schema
of problem solving formulated in Logic Theorist and the later development of GPS from
the same creators of Logic is “based on a view of general problem solving that reinforces the Cartesian ideal where true knowledge is purely mental and can be abstracted

69 Adam, “ConstrucAons of Gender in the History of ArAﬁcial Intelligence,” 45.
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away from the body.”70 The early quandaries of symbolic AI are based on the idea that
cognition and intelligence can be translated into “structures of physical symbols and
processes that act on them.”71 Next, Adams focuses on Cyc, an expert reasoning system pioneered in the mid-1980s that was still developing when Adams wrote this article.
Cyc, short for encyclopedia, is a project that aims to build a vast base of consensus
knowledge that can prime or train other expert systems that fail to “know” this basis and
often fail when asked cross-disciplinary questions. The epistemological problem with
Cyc is that what is assumed to be universal and objective reality, available to everyone,
is actually widely culturally relativistic and at risk of reifying taken for granted ideas and
concepts. Adams highlights that Cyc reproduces the “ideal Cartesian Man of Reason”
insofar as it “transcends bodily immanence” in its assertion that consensus knowledge
can be translated into propositional form.”72 She highlights Dreyfus’ critique of Cyc that
points out that this expert reasoning system cannot explain, for example, the knowledge
of riding a bicycle, since this knowledge cannot be translated into propositional form, as
it is corporeal knowledge of knowing how instead of knowing that. She emphasizes that,
“It is hard to escape the conclusion that, in its assumptions of a universal subject and
propositional representations of all forms of knowledge, Cyc too is modeled on the
Cartesian ideal male knower.”73

70 Adam, “ConstrucAons of Gender in the History of ArAﬁcial Intelligence,” 50.
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Challenges mounted against symbolic AI have increasingly focused on the need
to situate the knower as well as address the problem of embodiment for such systems.
The field of embedded or situated robotics faces up to the problem of embodiment insofar as movement is seen as the root of intelligence. Cog, unlike other systems, is a
physical robot created by Brooks and others at MIT. Cog is a “baby robot” whose intelligence and ways of knowing the world will grow as Cog grows from childhood to adulthood. While Cog offers a mitigation between the dichotomy of bodily immanence and
bodily transcendence that is at the core of the Cartesian Man of Reason, it is devoid of
a cultural setting and instead created and lives in a laboratory surrounded by the same
types of people who pioneered AI to begin with. Adam writes that “despite being endowed with certain human senses-vision, ears in the form of microphones, heat sensors, enormous funny bones, and a piezo-electric membrane “skin” triggering alarms on
contact with anything-Cog has no legs and lives bolted at the hips to a stand. It will be
programmed to recognize its mother’s face (a postgraduate student) and will be designed to learn so that future descendants of Cog can retrace the steps of millions of
years of evolution in a few years of laboratory experiments.”74
Adams highlights the relationship between body and knowledge as forming the
fundamental basis of our ways of knowing the world. She notes how Lakoff and Johnson’s work on categories and metaphors are key to knowledge: “They suggest that our
understanding of the metaphors for inside/outside, up/down, balance, and so on, which
Johnson in the particular claims are so fundamental to our knowledge and understanding of the world, make sense only in relation to our ability to experience these things in
74 Adam, “ConstrucAons of Gender in the History of ArAﬁcial Intelligence,” 52.
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the first place.”75 There are many key points Adams raises that challenge Cog’s ability to
know this and she suggests that its lack of gender is one of these dimensions. Adams
concludes that Cog is still leaving the Cartesian Man of Reason intact in that “elevation
of his mental knowledge may be somewhat dented, but there is still no one to replace
him.”76 While Cog can move and be real in its environment, Adams maintains that the
laboratory is no cultural or social environment. Complicating this, I would say that it is a
cultural and social environment, but a very specific one that is constituted by a domination of masculine identities from high socioeconomic backgrounds.
“Discriminating Systems” by Crawford, West and Whitacker presents the findings
of their year-long study focusing on the diversity crisis within AI, and in this sense very
much addresses the terrain of the cultural and social environment commonplace in AI
research. The results and themes echo the constraints of the field driven by the consolidation of similar identities, namely cis heterosexual masculine identities of similar socioeconomic backgrounds. They maintain: “Both within the spaces where AI is being
created, and in the logic of how AI systems are designed, the costs of bias, harassment,
and discrimination are borne by the same people: gender minorities, people of color,
and other under-represented groups. Similarly, the benefits of such systems, from profit
to efficiency, accrue primarily to those already in positions of power, who again tend to
be white, educated, and male.”77 The authors strictly maintain that this is not an inevitable and natural process but a social one that is shaped by structures and systems
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of power. It is the architecture of the industries that shape AI systems that reify the existing power structures. Examining this technology as an extension of systems of power prompts
us to not only “understand how AI disadvantages some, but that we also consider how it works
to the advantage of others, reinforcing a narrow idea of the ‘normal’ person.”78 The authors bring
up the example of Amazon’s resume scanning tool which downgraded resumes from people
who had attended women’s colleges and any resumes that included the word women’s. This
example, in their words, “is just one of many that show how the functional logics of a given
technology echo the gender and racial dynamics of the industry that produced it.”79 In addressing the question Who Makes AI, the authors discuss the low points in diversity. They note that “a
report produced by the research firm Element AI found that only 18% of authors at the leading
21 conferences in the field are women, while the 2018 Artificial Intelligence Index reports 80% of
AI professors are men.”80 Race fares worse than gender. When researchers complicate a singular gender lens with an intersectional approach, they find that “the proportion of bachelor’s
degree awards in engineering to black women declined 11% between 2000 and 2015”, a fall
which correlates “at the same time that the tech industry was establishing itself as a nexus of
wealth and power.”81 At the industry level, they highlight research findings that illustrate how
“The state of racial diversity in AI is even worse” detailing that “Only 2.5% of Google’s full-time
workers are black, and 3.6% Latinx, with black workers having the highest attrition rate of all
racial categories. Facebook isn’t much better: the company reported that with 4% black workers
and 5% ‘Hispanic’ workers in 2018, the company’s diversity is improving. Microsoft reflects simi-
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lar levels as Facebook, with 4% black workers, and 6% Latinx workers.”82 They discuss that
there is no data on trans workers or other nonbinary identities.83
Pipeline studies are those of which attempt to understand and map the ways in which
inequity and lack of representation occur within industries, with the goal being to curb these processes. Key themes of pipeline studies look at the barriers which limit women and people of
color from AI sectors and elucidate some barriers such as harassment; stereotypes and masculine dominated workplace cultures. The limitations of this research are of a methodological nature but more strikingly come from the operationalization of gender. When gender is posited as
a binary, it is often also framed within an essentialistic framework. The authors maintain that
“within this narrow frame, such research almost always focuses on women, and often implies
that the problem is one that resides within women’s individual psychology, whether it be a lack
of confidence or a lack of prior experience, as opposed to an issue with the institutions and their
cultures.”84 In 2019, the year this article was written, the authors emphasize that not much
change has happened. Pipeline studies have well documented the diversity crisis over the
years, but change has not been met. The authors question the motivation of pipeline studies
and put a spotlight on the ways in which these studies position the fix to the diversity crisis as a
burden for those who are discriminated against rather than elucidating the ways in which the
masculine work spaces fashion barriers and reward from them.85 They also maintain that simply
including women doesn’t inherently challenge the patriarchal structure below. The authors, quoting Sarah Banet-Weister, write: “the inclusion of women becomes the solution for all gender
problems, not just those of exclusion or absence. It is, of course, important to have bodies at the
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table, but their mere presence doesn’t necessarily challenge the structure that supports, and
builds, the table in the first place.”86 In 2017, James Damore, a software engineer at Google
published a memo that maintained biological differences between men and women as the explanation fo gender disparities at Google, rather than bias and discrimination. The authors note
that “deterministic logics are currently emerging within AI systems themselves.”87 Examples include a machine learning model that could predict whether someone was a criminal from their
ID photo and an AI system that determines from an image whether someone is introverted or
extroverted, among other qualities. What we are seeing here is a new terrain of determinism
being used to police normativity via machine learning and AI systems. The very reason that engineers are motivated to design such surveillance technologies, or anything related to this at all,
cannot be separated from the context of the times in which we live. Why not design other
things? Why is this being designed? For whom and from whom? Who does this endanger?
These are questions we need to explore.
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3. Methods
The methodology of this exploration drew upon the values and insights in queer studies,
anthropology, sociology, STS, feminist epistemology and utopian studies. I found that
these approaches were best-suited to looking across disciplines and exploring the complexity of the subjects of the body and technology, which more often than not like to intermingle.
I approached my framework of embodiment through the perspective of queer
studies, specifically the repertoire of queer methods which reflect on the fluidity, instability, multiplicity, intersectionality, and complexity of the ways we have come to think about
selves and bodies.88 Brim and Ghaziani describe the two-fold strength of queer social
research methods: first to “question the origins and effects of concepts and categories
rather than reify them” and second to “reject the fetishizing of the observable. If empiricism grants authority to categories introduction: Queer methods that are operationalized
into observable units, then to queer empiricism means to embrace multiplicity, misalignments, and silences.”89 This research design was further shaped by feminist methods. I specifically drew from the tenets of feminist epistemology and the philosophy of
science, which focus on the production of knowledge. Situated knowledge is a foundational concept in feminist epistemology that explores how knowledge is shaped and
constructed by social location, context, intersectionality and interpretation.90

88 Ward, “Dyke Methods.”
89 Brim & Ghaziani, “Introduction,” 16-17.
90 Haraway, “Situated Knowledges” & Harding, Whose science? Whose knowledge.
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Though I see overlap between methodology of STS, feminist epistemology and
philosophy of science, I was particularly inspired by Emily Martin and Ursula Le Guin’s
attention to how metaphor and narrative shape what we think we can know.91 Anthropologists have worked to reformulate the field in many ways, one of which I drew heavily from was Lila Abu-Lughod’s call for ethnographies of the particular92 and Anna Tsing’s
shift to studying assemblages and relationships to better understand the world we live
in.93
Finally, this research was steered by Utopian theory, a multidisciplinary direction
focusing on ways in which people have and continue to live in ways that are otherwise
to structures that look and feel all-encompassing. This is elaborated upon by Ruth Levitas, who writes: “the core of utopia is the desire for being otherwise, individually and collectively, subjectively and objectively. Its expressions explore and bring to debate the
potential contents and contexts of human flourishing. It is thus better understood as a
method than a goal— a method elaborated here as the Imaginary Reconstitution of Society.”94 The utopian as a method builds on a visionary, often ad hoc and especially
imaginative approach to desires and dreams. It begins with the knowledge that things
could be otherwise, looks for alternative worlds, and in their rare absence engages in a
rich lived scholarship of world-building. This research is infused with the insights garnered through the aforementioned scholarships and seeks to apply those approaches to

91 Martin, “Egg and the Sperm.” & Le Guin, “Carrier Bag Theory of Fiction.”
92Abu-Lughod, “Writing Against Culture.”
93

Tsing, The Mushroom at the End of the World.

94 Levitas, “Utopia as Method.”
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understanding how the bodies are shaped and changed in their interaction with technologies. Looking across materials, sites of meaning, experiments, case studies, actual
happenings, art, shiny technical products and theory with an informed interdisciplinary
methodology may offer a way to break out of the limits that encircle entities and derive
within them qualities that appear separate. Understanding that all forms, shapes, and
cases are legitimate and real is a key step to deconstructing and digesting boundaries
that constrain thinking. Taking deconstruction a step further means looking for alternatives for the body/machine and assuming a utopian impulse to negotiate the ways in
which power shapes who and what can be dreamed up, but further envisaging the possibilities for embodied technologies with a radical agenda.
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4. Case Studies
“The medium is the message.”95
“Who cyborgs will be is a radical question; the answers are a matter of survival.”96
Read together, the literature speaks to the ways in which power flows through the creation of technological forms. Now we will examine three case studies. These case studies can be understood as different configurations of the body with technology. We need
to expand our ideas of what is possible for techno bodies in order to understand how
they are affected by the technoscapes to which they belong. These case studies all
present a unique construction of a body made real through its interaction with technologies. Rather than looking to create typologies drawing distinctions to the ways in which
technologies are differentiated, these case studies can be read as thought experiments,
musings, longings and contestations to the legitimacy of technological determinism and
hegemony. We have to consider that the ways in which embodiment is formulated in situ
of a technoscape depends greatly on the desires for bodies, contributing to not only how
bodies are rendered, but why they are made visible and invisible. It is a case of form following function. These cases spotlight a common feature: they are merges between
human/machine, to some extent or another.

95 McLuhan, “Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man.”
96 Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 12.
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I.

Mariko Mori

Tokyo born multimedia artist, Mariko Mori, has established herself as a creator of
the imagined and liminal spaces between dichotomies like human/machine; real/fiction;
now/there. In the nineties, her work took to the medium of the self-portrait where Mori
blended elements of costume design, prosthesis and sculpture to engage with the fusion between technology and culture. In her piece, Play With Me, Mariko Mori, pictured
as a cyborg coyly stands next to a video game console outside of a toy store in Tokyo.
Head tilted, the turquoise hair of her prosthetic wig cascades down her shoulders as her
eyes are fixed peering out of frame. This photograph, like others created by Mori, features a feminine cyborg figure embodied by Mori who are embedded within Japanese
society. In Subway, Mori is a cyborg on the underground and in Tea Ceremony she is a
humanoid figure serving tea to businessmen who do not seem to notice she is there.
Many of these photographs confront notions of liminality, and the people pictured alongside Mori as a cyborg do not seem to notice.
In other pieces, Mori’s liminality between human and machine extends the body
to space. The cyborg no longer inhabits purely recognizable human scenes but exists in
the cosmos (‘Genesis (Soap Bubbles), 1996) or bathed in a purple light and surrounded
by metal (Miko no Iori). Wave UFO is a cybernetic spaceship and interactive art installation built by Mori and her team in 2003. Once inside, visitors to Wave UFO put on electrodes which translate their brain waves into art that they can watch above, projected
onto the ceiling of the spaceship. In Empty Dreams, Mori is a fusion between fish and
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woman, and the resulting mermaid figure is stamped multiple times in a clone-like fashion across a photograph of the Seagaia Ocean Dome, an artificial beach of the nineties
in Japan. In her work, Mori challenges the form and valances for hybrids, cyborgs and
avatars. Her spaceship is just as much of a cyborg as is her recognizable cyberpunk
aesthetic in her self-portraits. It is not recognizably human, but inside of its structure it
translates aspects of the human mind into art.
Mori’s oeuvre has been analyzed within a framework of cyborg feminism given its
obvious engagement with the cyborg body and form. Mori’s cyborgs are replete with scifi iconography: they wear metal, they playfully exist with fantastical prostheses and they
disobey ideas of existing in a fixed time and space. Reading “A Cyborg Manifesto” in the
context of Mori’s work highlights Haraway’s idea that, “a cyborg world might be about
lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with
animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory
standpoints.”97
Mori’s work embodies the boundary-crossings between animal/human and between human and machine. She describes: “I’m interested in the relationship between
fantasy and reality, and how they co-exist…it’s about fantasy created by technology
which is turning into reality.”98 It is difficult not to see the utopian tendencies within
Mori’s work. Rooted in this relationship between fantasy and reality, but deeply engaged
and devoted to technology, Mori ideates forms and figures that are at once here and
elsewhere. They suggest the possible containers, backdrops and bodies of a cyborg

97 Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 15.
98 Rachel Schreiber “Cyborgs, avatars, Laa-Laa and Po: The work of Mariko Mori,” 11.
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world. At the same time, Mori’s cyborgs are all Japanese and feminine figures, striking
with Haraway’s idea “that “women of color” might be understood as a cyborg identity, a
potent subjectivity synthesized from fusions of “outsider” identities”.99 Her 1999 architectural feat Dream Temple is a hybrid, or assemblage between Horyuji Yumedono, a Japanese temple that dates back thirteen hundred years ago and her own vision of its
contemporary power when reimagined as a vision-dome with metal, plastic and fiber optics. Furthermore, her series Esoteric Commons brings these fusions together with
themes of traditional Japanese iconography; multiplicity; sublime landscapes.
Mori’s cyborgs do impossible things and their identities are non-unitary. In a
cross-analysis of Haraway and of Mori’s work, Thyrza Goodeve notes that “although
Mori has been quoted as saying the women in her work ‘appear to be happy because
they are cyborgs, not real women’ anyone who has seriously considered Haraway’s often cited Manifesto for Cyborg… knows that the distinction between real women and
cyborgs is itself an outmoded fiction.”100 She concludes, “in other words, Mariko Mori’s
women are real cyborgs.”101 Mori’s cyborgs populate the space of possibilities for the
body and forms that are cracked open by a disregard for dichotomies that purport separation between entities. Mori explains her position on oneness in an interview: “The
oneness could be from the largest multi-universe to primary particles, or oneness from
the past to the future. Time-wise and space-wise, we think our body from the outside is
separate from the inside, but oneness means there is no separation of every living ele-

99 Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 54.
100 Goodeve, “Mariko Mori’s Cyborg Surrealism,” 99.
101 Ibid.
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ment. There is no limit to the oneness”102 Mori’s work surpasses aesthetics, it proposes
new forms and mediums for the intersection of bodies, materials technologies. It reformulates these interactions in ways that challenge how bodies exist. In Mori’s oeuvre,
her bodies are rid of the human/nonhuman dichotomy and exist in technoscapes in
ways they could not if conceptualized in a way that constrains multiplicity and non-unitary selves. Mori’s cyborgs are blueprints for other ways to visualize science and technology. The cyborgs are alternative longings for fusions between body/machine, they
are speculative assemblages and cases for hybridity.

II: @lilmiquela
Miquela is a Brazilian-American social media influencer and self-identified
“Change-seeking robot” as reads her Instagram biography. 103 Miquela’s existence is
one that is ultimately defined by a crisis in classification. Her freckles, flyaways, shadow
and at times visible pores do not settle the confusion of what Miquela is. Miquela exemplifies what Dr. Masahiro Mori meant when he wrote about the uncanny valley. Dr.
Masahiro Mori, a renowned roboticist, discussed a trajectory for forms with human
characteristics and located the ‘uncanny valley’ as the gulf wherein forms take on a
strange quality due to the ways in which they trouble the boundary between real human
and artificial human.104 This term refers to the provocation of discomfort when one has
to look a little closer to assess the legibility of the form.

102 MARIKO MORI with Jessica Holmes, “The Brooklyn Rail."
103 @lilmiquela, Biography.
104 Masahiro Mori, "The Uncanny Valley."
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In 2018 Miquela came out to her social media followers as a self-identified robot.
In a series of six notes posted to Instagram, Miquela describes her inception as being
built to be a servant and her liberation through the technology of her parent company
Brud. These notes chronicle her confusion and dissociation upon discovering that what
has made her feel so different from everyone else are her robotic roots. She diaries:
I’m a robot. It just doesn’t sound right. I feel so human. I cry and I laugh and I
dream. I fall in love...I’m so upset and afraid. The more I feel those feelings the
worse it gets. These emotions are just a computer program. But yet they still
hurt.105

@lilmiquela’s case is made even more fascinating because she is not a robot, at least in
the traditional sense. Robotics and cybernetics imply a tangibility, an embodiment and
materiality. Though robotics does always necessitate a humanoid appearance, it seems
that Miquela’s creative construction has built on notions of robots and AI that resonate
with a wide cultural audience. It is almost as if to be robot or to be AI means being perfect, while at the same time living a tragic dissonance between human and machine.
Miquela’s aforementioned caption resonates with these concepts.
An article by The Cut explores the background of @lilmiquela. They write that
“she is an avatar puppeteered by Brud, a mysterious L.A.-based start-up of “engineers,
storytellers, and dreamers” who claim to specialize in artificial intelligence and
robotics.”106 Another examination by the media platform Cultured further elucidates:
“According to public records, Brud holds no patents in AI, robotics, or related fields.”107
105 @lilmiquela, Post from April 19, 2018.
106 Emilia Petrarca, “Body Con Job.”
107Jenna Sauers, “Life After Fiction: The Future of Lil Miquela.”
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The forever nineteen avatar does not stand alone. There are others like her, who
confuse boundaries between the virtual and the real. This confusion is strategic, in that
the fascination and black-boxing of high tech, like AI and cybernetics, obscures the materiality. For example, according to an article from a tech media publication: “Brud, the
company behind the virtual celebrity Lil Miquela, is now worth at least $125 million
thanks to a new round of financing the company is currently closing. Meanwhile, new
venture-backed companies like the super stealthy Shadows, SuperPlastic and Toonstar
are all developing virtual characters that will launch via social media channels like Snap
and Instagram, or on their own platforms.”108 Lil Miquela is a virtual marketing tool, one
that is profiting off of shared iconography and meaning of AI and robotics but created in
ways that arguably involve little to no high-technological creation. It is her image, rather,
that creates the confusion. You will not run into her outside, although many of her photos appear as though she is laying in a grassy park or sitting on a curb. Her intelligence
is artificial insofar as it is intelligence via proxy: her ideas and emotional posts are written by her creators, those who work for a start-up that is transforming consumer capitalism through a strategic application of the semiotics of artificial intelligence and cybernetics.
Brud uses branding strategies like storytelling and character-building to construct
the amorphous qualities of their marketing tool @lilmiquela in such a way that makes us
question her “true” identity. Her robot cosplay functions as a metaphysical guise for her
market dedicated purposes. Though she self-identifies as a robot, I think Miquela too is
a cyborg. She embodies the confusion of the Western border between real/artificial. She

108Jonathan Shieber, “More investors are betting on virtual influencers like Lil Miquela.”
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is also constructed to perform the identity of a queer woman of color. Complicating this,
The Cut shares Miquela’s words from an Instagram post that reads: “I’m not sure I can
comfortably identify as a woman of color… ‘Brown’ was a choice made by a corporation.
‘Woman’ was an option on a computer screen.”109 And while classification systems in AI
often do work off of these classificatory dualisms, it is clear that Miquela’s physicality
and representation were carefully contrived. Miquela’s representation is decidedly constructed around femininity and race. An article on the subject highlights that “Brud ventriloquizes queer, second-generation immigrant identity through Miquela’s increasingly
targeted posts about her racial background. There’s something sinister about Brud using Miquela’s half-Spanish and half-Brazilian design to market mixed-race identity as a
form of power and cache; her curated ethnicity—specifically created to appeal to Generation Z—slots neatly into the age old “mestiza.”110 In the case of @lilmiquela, technological embodiment is achieved through an uncanny legibility of humanness that is built
out of her mestizaje racialization and feminine performance. @lilmiquela is a creative
project funded through consumer capitalism to weave personality and to represent as
well as craft a body through digital content that exists no further than the screen.

III: Machine learning
In the Fall of 2019 an app called ImageNet Roulette was released. The app was
simple. A user would upload a photo and after a few moments, the image retracts
against a white background wherein labels like wrongdoer/maidservant/failure/non-

109 Emilia Petrarca, “Body Con Job.”
110Rosa Boshier, “This is Fucky.”
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smoker might appear beneath. The app became tremendously popular, receiving up to
100,000 user uploads per hour before it was taken down.111
Photos regularly returned back to the user with disconcertingly racist and misogynistic results ranging from ‘gook’ to ‘first-time offender.’ Mine, for example, classified
me as [maid,maidservant,housemaid, amah: a female domestic]. ImageNet Roulette
was a short-lived digital art project created by digital artist Trevor Paglen and AI researcher Kate Crawford to illustrate how machine learning works.
Machine learning is a specific application of artificial intelligence. Researchers at
the AI Now Institute urge that “AI should be understood as more than just technical approaches. It is also developed out of the dominant social practices of engineers and
computer scientists who design the systems, and the industrial infrastructure and companies that run those systems. Thus, a more complete definition of AI includes technical
approaches, social practices and industrial power.”112 Machine learning is a specific application of artificial intelligence. It is defined by the AI Now Institute:
In current use, machine learning (ML) is the field most commonly associated with the current explosion of AI. Machine learning is a set of techniques and
algorithms that can be used to ‘train’ a computer program to automatically recognize patterns in a set of data. Many different tools fall under the umbrella of “machine learning.” Though there are exceptions, ML generally uses “features” or
“variables” (e.g. the location of fire departments in a city, data from surveillance
cameras, attributes of criminal defendants) taken from a set of “training data” to
learn these patterns without explicitly being told what those patterns are by humans. Machine learning has come to include things that have historically been
more simply called “statistics.” Machine learning is the technique at the heart of
new automated decision systems, making it difficult for humans to understand
the logic behind those systems.”113

111”ImageNet Roulette: Viral Phenomenon Exposes a Dangerous AI Flaw”
112

AI Now, “Algorithmic Accountability Policy Toolkit,” 2.

113 Ibid.
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Machine learning is the supervised or unsupervised processes by which technical systems reproduce meaning. What this requires is a vast amount of data and the
attachment of sociocultural meaning unto the datasets. These sets are referred to as
“training sets” by which the computer ‘learns’ to classify, categorize and make patterns
around the data. ImageNet Roulette uses the training sets of ImageNet, a vast constellation of images co-created by Stanford Professor Fei-Fei Li, who described the initial
purpose of the project as to “map out the entire world of objects.”114 ImageNet is cannon
for computer-vision research, and at its completion “consisted of over 14 million labeled
images organized into more than 20 thousand categories.”115 This vast swath of data, in
the form of images, was then coded and classified by piecemeal workers of the crowdsourcing platform Amazon Turk Workers.
Data ossifies as it is inscribed with meaning through training off of large datasets.
Far from a neutral process, machine learning reproduces categorical thinking that is imbued with the logic of the sociocultural systems in which they are embedded. Crawford
and Paglen describe: “There’s a kind of sorcery that goes into the creation of categories. To create a category or to name things is to divide an almost infinitely complex
universe into separate phenomena. To impose order onto an undifferentiated mass, to
ascribe phenomena to a category—that is, to name a thing-- is in turn a means of reifying the existence of that category.”116

114 Crawford & Paglen, “Excavating AI.”
115 Ibid.
116 Ibid.
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Machine learning is expert at reifying categories, as this is its unique architectural foundation. This is obviously less pernicious when it is reifying categories between,
say, an apple and an orange. In ImageNet Roulette, Crawford and Paglen wanted to
exhibit how the deployment of artificial intelligence technology in the form of machine
learning uses the foundation of categories to classify people. Specifically, they wanted
to illustrate to the public that this classification process reifies the politics embedded
within categories. It is no glitch that this process labeled certain bodies with offensive
racialized and gendered language. It is an exposure of the inner-workings and operationalizations of gender and race that course through the structure of artificial intelligence. What they did was open the black box technology of ImageNet. They describe
their mission as such: “As we have shown, ImageNet contains a number of problematic,
offensive, and bizarre categories. Hence, the results ImageNet Roulette returns often
draw upon those categories. That is by design: we want to shed light on what happens
when technical systems are trained using problematic training data. AI classifications of
people are rarely made visible to the people being classified. ImageNet Roulette provides a glimpse into that process—and to show how things can go wrong.”117

117 Ibid.
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5. Discussion
>Bodies in the black box
ImageNet Roulette is a recent highly accessible exhibition of the reification of social bias into technical systems, truly what is meant by Bruno Latour’s quippy title Technology is Society Made Durable. However, this harm is not new, nor is it bounded in the
datasets of ImageNet. It is important to see AI's interaction with bodies and selves as a
unique formulation of who and what counts as a body. The ways that bodies are formulated through AI is one that continues to cascade into serious implications for defining
lives that are privileged or precarious.
In “Gender Shades” Joy Buolamwini and Timnit Gebru evaluate the invisiblization of Black women within machine learning sets. The results of their findings highlight
that these sets are skewed towards disproportionately rendering and representing white
males with accuracy. Accuracy, in part, comes from more complex data and representation of certain identities. Buolamwini and Gebru share that “LFW, a dataset composed of
celebrity faces which has served as a gold standard benchmark for face recognition,
was estimated to be 77.5% male and 83.5% White (Han and Jain, 2014).”118 Through
an intersectional approach, the research of these scholars “shows that all algorithms
perform worse on female and darker subjects when compared to their counterpart male
and lighter subjects.”119 In “Gender Shades,” Buolwami and Gebru expand on the risk of
face recognition technology, stressing that "while face recognition software by itself
should not be trained to determine the fate of an individual in the criminal justice sys-

118 Buolamwini and Gebru, “Gender Shades,” 3.
119 Buolamwini and Gebru, “Gender Shades,” 10.
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tem, it is very likely that such software is used to identify suspects. Thus, an error in the
output of a face recognition algorithm used as input for other tasks can have serious
consequences. For example, someone could be wrongfully accused of a crime based
on erroneous but confident misidentification of the perpetrator from security video
footage analysis.”120
In “Predictive Inequity in Object Detection” researchers at Georgia Tech report
their findings that autonomous vehicle systems disproportionately risk pedestrians of
darker complexion. They maintain: “uniformly poorer performance of these systems
when detecting pedestrians with Fitzpatrick skin types between 4 and 6”121 which correlate to moderately brown skin; dark brown skin and deeply pigmented dark to brown
skin, respectively.122 The social implications for socially-designed technical systems for
which bodies are visualized and which are rendered invisible is of great consequence,
and ultimately carry consequences of life and death.
In “The Misgendering Machines” Os Keyes investigates how the field of humancomputer interaction (HCI) understands gender and how these notions are operationalized in automatic gender recognition (AGR) technologies. Keyes found that AGR and
subsequently HCI operationalize a trans-exclusive schema of gender that treats gender
as immutable, physiological and binary. As long as this technology relies on external interference, it cannot do more than reify trans-exclusion and marginalization because
trans and nonbinary identities arise through self-determination. Given that these tech-

120Buolamwini and Gebru, “Gender Shades,” 1.
121 Wilson, Hoffman, Morgenstern, “Predictive Inequity in Object Detection,” 1.
122”Fitzpatrick Skin Photo-type” from Australian Government.
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nologies pose serious and real harms and risk for trans and nonbinary identities, Keyes
decries the task of questioning their purpose, necessity and existence. They write that
“HCI urgently needs to do better, both generally, by applying the "hermeneutics of suspicion" to the tools, methods and theories we integrate, and specifically, through operationalizing and understanding gender in a nuanced way. Without active work, these
problems are unlikely to get better over time: HCI will continue to both directly and indirectly harm trans people.”123 Keyes writes specifically about how HCI and AGR’s deployment of an essentialist understanding of gender propagates risk to trans and nonbinary people given the intent to categorize binary gender. This risk takes the form of
gendered violence/misgendering/erasure with the understanding that these effects inform and overlap with one another. For example, Keyes writes about the multifaceted
and intersectional risk and potential of violence if AGR is implemented to policing access to gendered bathrooms. They describe that this would “simply automate the possibility of violence” specifying that “the situation is likely to be worst for trans feminine
people of colour.”124
In another paper, Os Keyes discusses how facial recognition is a modern application of technology used to address an age-old tactic of surveillance. Addressing surveillancing in the form of biometrics, Keyes concludes that “We need to acknowledge
that immigration restrictions, identity documents, and these data collection practices
have always been about race, and that in such an environment, collecting this data—

123 Keyes, “Misgendering Machines,” 9.
124 Keyes, “Misgendering Machines,” 11.
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even with the best of intentions—will always end up putting a weapon in the hands of
those who would use it against poor, vulnerable, and marginalized people.”125
Far from neutral, artificial intelligence and machine learning reify means of classification and categorization of bodies that are socially constructed. The AI Now Institute
draws attention to this idea that “humans classify what data should be collected to be
used in automated decision systems, collect the data, determine the goals and uses of
the systems, decide how to train and evaluate the performance of the systems, and ultimately act on the decisions and assessments made by the systems. So, like humans,
they are not infallible.”126 Bodies and selves become located and dislocated through the
socio-technical pathways built into artificial intelligence and its machine learning toolkit.
This happens through the ways in which these technologies have been designed to
construe which bodies count as bodies. Irma van der Ploeg elucidates this idea of
counting, she writes:

In the context of surveillance practices with their social sorting effects, these issues are of particular concern, for social sorting based on bodily differences may easily
slip into the pernicious forms of exclusion and discrimination that were at the centre of
the great emancipatory struggles of the previous century.Illustrative of these problems
are the set of technologies emblematic of the use of bodies in surveillance: biometrics.
Here, issues of similarity and difference emerge in at least two different ways (van der
Ploeg 2010). On the one hand there is the matter of exclusion of certain categories of
“different” people from system use, because the systems can only cope with difference
to a limited extent.127

125

Keyes, “Our Face Recognition Nightmare Began Decades Ago. Now It’s Expanding.”
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Now, “Algorithmic Accountability Policy Toolkit,” 5.

127 Irma van der Ploeg, “The body as data in the age of information,” 182.
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The scholars who study the intersection between artificial intelligence and identities note that the ways in which bodies and selves become visibilized and invisibilized
are myriad in their purpose and effect, but together reflect existing social hierarchies
and structures of power. Like other hybrids that challenge boundaries related to the
body, AI—as it is operationalized through facial recognition, automatic gender recognition and machine learning datasets trained on human bodies— renders selves and bodies through sociotechnical practices that determine who is seen and how they are seen.

>Where does the body begin and end?

When the aggregate systems of AI, like machine learning, run into human bodies
there is much at stake. We have to consider how AI is a socialized assemblage and how
training ‘intelligent’ systems is the socialization of the values and hegemonies of dominant culture. This is how bias ossifies. At first glance, AI, unlike the cyborgean bodies
imagined and created by Mori or the virtual-marketing tool/robot/avatar @lilmiquela,
may seem immaterial and intangible. We cannot touch it. Where is flesh flesh? ...Where
is the metal? I cannot see it.
AI appears to have an intangible and nonphysical characteristic: their interaction
takes place within computation and code. These processes are invisible, miniaturized
and hidden within systems. They are not meant to be seen. On the contrary, Mori’s
technological bodies are concrete and physical. They have an exoskeleton, even if
there is nothing beneath. Though the photographs do not bulge out of the frame, they

60
Flesh Without Blood: (Re)locating Embodiment in Technology

have existed through the physicality of Mori, they have frozen a performance of a cyborgian identity. Though her cyborgian and cyberpunk presentations are relegated to a
portrait frame, Mori did actually embody them and ideate them. Other material cyborg
projects of Mori’s like Wave UFO have existed in exhibition spaces though they might
return to and from storage. You can clearly see and sometimes even physically interact
with her hybrid creative projects in a way that takes on an extrusive-quality. The embodiment is tangible. And while @lilmiquela exists only at the edge of the screen, her personality and appearance are so carefully attenuated that her audience asks into the
technological void for the clarification … are you real??
The intangible, nonphysical and concave quality of embodiment in AI may stem
from its miniaturization, closed doors and black boxing, but it clearly renders bodies in
similar ways. It is important to understand that AI and its application of machine learning
as a case of reformulating embodiment in technology. Just as Mori’s creative works
imagine hybrid identities and forms and @lilmiquela dabbles in virtual identity/performance consumerism, AI’s deployment of machine learning defines how unsupervised or
supervised systems see bodies, and what bodies that are seen come to mean.
AI is presented and framed in such immaterial ways that it feels invisible. A quote
by Haraway tugs at me here: “Miniaturization has turned out to be about power; small is
not so much beautiful as pre-eminently dangerous, as in cruise missiles."128 But this is
not the story of cruise missiles. This is the idea that miniaturization has made it very
hard for us to see the way embodiment is very much wrapped up in artificial intelligence,

128 Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” 4.
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up to the most minute algorithms. Is it just that embodiment has been made too small
for us to see?
Though Alison Adam writes in detail about the project of AI’s long-standing neglect of physicality, I would argue that it has to do with physicality in other key ways.
Though the technology itself is physically disembodied, AI as a broad assemblage of
technologies relates to embodiment in that it locates, relocates and also dislocates bodies. Furthermore, it can locate and relocate and dislocate bodies over time, multiple
times and through space. Irma van der Ploeg echos an idea similar to this in her piece
“The body as data in the age of information.” She describes that “Over the course of
several decades, and in tandem with developments in information technologies, a new
body has been emerging. It is a body that is defined in terms of information. Who you
are, how you are, and how you are going to be treated in various situations, is increasingly known to various agents and agencies through information deriving from your own
body; information that is processed elsewhere, through the networks, databases, and
algorithms of the information society.”129
Van der Ploeg discusses how this new body that is emerging is one that is increasingly surveillanced, classified and categorized. It is one defined by the minute data
about it, like its genetic profile, its nicotine intake, its propensity for disease.130 She
notes: “With our bodies gradually becoming entities consisting of information— the body
as data—the boundary between the body itself and information about that body cannot

129 Irma van der Ploeg, ““The body as data in the age of information,” 177
130 Ibid.
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be taken for granted anymore.”131 When machine learning and artificial intelligence
merge with the body, there begins a process of translation and transcription of data of
the body into data about the body, which is held in code and in the medium of information. Van der Ploeg highlights the boundary-bending power of the translation of body
into code: “The digitized body can be transported to places far removed, both in time
and space, from the person belonging to the body concerned. Databases can be remotely accessed through network connections; they are built to save information and
allow retrieval over extended periods of time. A bodily search or examination used to
require the presence of the person involved—a premise so self-evident that to question
it would be ridiculous. Today, however, this is not so obvious any more.”132
Suggesting that AI is imbricated in a process of body-making is to draw attention
to the ways in which ‘neutral’ high-tech machines render visibility and representation to
human selves and lives. It is also to highlight the complexity of the ways in which blackboxed technologies are (re)formulating the conventional ways of seeing and understanding bodies, that is, we must look outside of where the limits of bodies have been
demarcated. Without a doubt, technology is shaping and producing new bodies. But will
we be able to recognize that a new body has been emerging if we cannot see it?
Maybe another way to think about the ways in which artificial intelligence is involved in a body-making project is to place it within the spectrum of other techno-bodies, right alongside automata and robots. The selves that are located, relocated and dislocated through and by artificial intelligence are cyborgs too, they are human/machine

131 Irma van der Ploeg, ““The body as data in the age of information,” 179.
132 Ibid.
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hybrids. Artist and professor at Barnard College, John Miller, writes that “Rather than
becoming cybernetic organisms, the masses have become organisms embedded within
overarching cybernetic apparatuses. In a sense, the individual body is unbounded and
spread over a neural communications web.”133 Miller barely addresses artificial intelligence in this essay, which accompanied a 2017 art exhibition called “Cyborg Dreams,”
but it feels as if he is responds to my urge to place bodies created by AI in the same
category as cyborgs. He maintains: “Whether or not this makes them cyborgs is largely
a semantic point, even if, in the wake of Donna Haraway’s polemics, a whole host of
critics and theorists have been quick to lay claim to cyborg identities. Yet, as William J.
Mitchell maintains, it is networking – not hybridization – that automates a cyborg to its
maximum capacity. A network can enable a cybernetic condition without having to physically alter the bodies it subsumes.”134 It is not so much an ontological tendency as
much as it is a desire to deconstruct the fetishism and determinism through which AI is
seen. This hearkens to Frederic Jameson’s concept of the ‘hysterical sublime,’ a remix
on Kant’s idea of the sublime which fixates on technology as the awe-inducing pre-eminent phenomena, rather than Kant’s focus on nature.135
I wonder if the ways in which we conceptualize the limits of the body effect a myopia in tracing the interconnected strands between technologies and power. If the body
ends [here], then how can we address consequences for bodies that are (re)located
over [there]? Embodiment, as it is translated into data {pictures/video/audio…} locates,

133 John Miller, “Cyborg Dreams,” 4.
134 Ibid.
135 Oxford Reference.
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dislocates and relocates ways we have configured the body. The body can now exist
through time and space, overlapping and holding multiple presences insofar as it is rendered over and over again through technologies under artificial intelligence. We are
pushed to understand that the social implications of this technology for bodies challenge
the traditional limits of where bodies begin and end. That is, outside of a physical body.
Outside of right now. I am not sure where it begins and ends, but it is reformulated in
multiple ways, places and times.

>The Utopian
The three case studies explored the different ways in which embodiment can be reformulated in technology. A cornerstone of this investigation is to consider that these forms
all legitimately produce and construct an understanding of bodies and selves in their
ideation and conception. This is not to take an approach of moral nihilism. Just because
bodies are produced and formulated in these contexts and embedded in unique and
specific sociocultural locations within a vast technoscape does not mean to disregard
the social consequences that come from a blueprint of an interaction between body/machine. The machine learning case study is meant to illustrate how bodies located and
relocated through technologies driven by classification and categorization are exposed
to risk and violence in ways that echo the sociocultural hierarchies to which these technologies pertain. It is also to draw attention to the motivations around the technology,
largely related to surveillance. I would like to drive home the idea that human-computer
interaction, especially as achieved through machine learning and deployed in AGR and
facial-recognition constructs human/machine hybrids, or models of bodies and selves

65
Flesh Without Blood: (Re)locating Embodiment in Technology

that become vulnerable and at risk. This is in part because AI as a field is a massive industrial, social and technical project built on and through systems of power.
The work of Mori and @lilmiquela also reformulate identity, selves and bodies in
interaction with technoscape: they have built human/machine hybrids as well, except
these blueprints are viewed as “art” or “social media/marketing.” My goal has been to
illustrate that these are all equally legitimate encasements for a technobody. Rather
than just aesthetic, artists like Mori and innovations like @lilmiquela are reimagining
what counts as a tech body, and the consequences are very different and contrary to
the technobodies that arise out of the digitization of the human body in artificial intelligence. There is a difference between the effects of human/machine hybrids created out
of a desire for artistic expression, consumerism and biopower.
This is the basis of a dream-audit or a utopian impulse for techno bodies. Avery
Gordon articulates the utopian impulse “to make the fictional, the theoretical, and the
factual speak to one another.”136 The foundation of exploring alternatives to selves reformulated in the context of technology is understanding that who gets to say what a
body means is ultimately an expression of power. I am prodded along by a gem written
by Sandy Stone, which reminds us that “Bodies are screens on which we see projected
the momentary settlements that emerge from ongoing struggles over beliefs and practices within the academic and medical communities. These struggles play themselves
out in arenas far removed from the body. Each is an attempt to gain a high ground that
is profoundly moral in character, to make an authoritative and final explanation for the

136 Avery Gordon, “Ghostly Matters,” 26.
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way things are and consequently for the way they must continue to be. In other words,
each of these accounts is culture speaking with the voice of an individual.”137
The taken for granted boundaries and barriers between artistic/technical/imaginative/scientific creations of bodies need to be deconstructed for us to see the possibilities
for ‘unearthly’ forms and reformulated manifestations of selves that carry a radical potentiality. Understanding that large corporate and powerful projects that obscure the way
bodies are imbricated and locked into black-boxed “high-technology” is key. However,
we cannot stop there. We must demand alternative representation that is seen as legitimate. We need to understand the ways in which, for the most part, it has been people
in positions of power who have been able to dream up and imagine tech bodies that
have become materialized.
While there are other methods for dreaming and imagining, many of them arrive
in a toolkit fit for artists or storytellers. The idea of a cyborg —such as depicted in the
worlds of cyberpunk, by Mori or Hajime Sorayama— has lived only in mediums of fantasy and performance. AI is very much a creative project, just as Mori’s installations and
cyborgean performances are technical and scientific. However, the language of what is
technical and what is artistic, and the separation of these as different entities, obscures
the underlying sociotechnical imagination that undercuts all projects. To understand this
is to bend open the crust that has formed over the oneness of creation and manifestation and posited processes like technical method and artistic approach as separate entities. We have to understand that the ways in which artificial intelligence (re)locates and
dislocates embodiment is a creative project of body-making, but one that is constricted.

137 Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back,” 350.
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Stephen Wilson in “Artificial Intelligence Research as Art” asks questions that
build upon a dream-audit for technobodies:
Why do we accept as foreordained that computers and monitors must manifest
themselves in metal, wood, or plastic? Who decreed that they need to look like
electronic devices? Perhaps they should look like stuffed animals. Perhaps they
should not be restricted to one physical locus but rather spread out so that whole
spaces become active. Who said that typing or moving a mouse is the best way
for us to communicate with a computer? Similarly, who said that displaying text
on a screen or a piece of paper is the best way for the computer to respond to
people?138

Unveiling technological projects as socially constructed materializations of power
brings us to a place where we can better critique the ways in which these technologies
precipitate disproportionate harm for marginalized bodies. We need to understand the
way that power and differential access is reproduced and reified within technology. This
is a move from understanding technologies as cultural products to viewing them also as
sociocultural producers. Unveiling the constructed nature elucidates how hegemonic
structures that we move in and through mindlessly are not inevitable, and with this understanding comes the space to imagine alternatives. Gordon eloquently puts this idea
as so: “We need to know where we live in order to imagine living elsewhere. We need to
imagine living elsewhere before we can live there.”139
Speculative fiction and Afrofuturism are genres that are significant for their abilities to forge space and work with time. The speculative is a method that can imagine
different configurations, an exercise in world-building. In “Racial Fictions, Biological
Facts”, Ruha Benjamin writes “novel fictions that reimagine and rework all that is taken
138 Stephen Wilson, “Artificial Intelligence Research as Art,” 403.
139 Avery Gordon, Ghostly Ma1ers, 5.
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for granted about the current structure of the social world— alternatives to capitalism,
racism, and patriarchy— are urgently needed. Fictions in this sense are not falsehoods
but refashioning through which analysts experiment with different scenarios, trajectories, and reversals, elaborating new values and testing different possibilities for creating
a more just and equitable society. Such fictions are not meant to convince others of
what is, but to expand our own vision of what is possible.”140 And so Benjamin experiments with speculative fiction as a method to challenge the nexus of knowledge and
power and to draw out the complicated but liberatory effect of dreaming up alternatives
to structures. In “Ferguson is the Future,”141 Benjamin imagines a world where events of
Ferguson are celebrated because they catalyzed the abolition of the police-state. Victims of police brutality like Eric Garner and Aiyana Mo’Nay Stanley-Jones have been
resurrected through biotechnological innovations that allow for reparation of stolen life
through stem cell technology. Following in the steps of science fiction writer Octavia Butler, the works of activists and writers showcased in the anthology Octavia’s Brood build
worlds and imagine different realities. In Black Angel, Walidah Imarisha shares the story
of A., a fallen-angel turned protector of people marginalized in New York City. While
walking the dark streets, A. oversees ICE deporting families into trucks under the cover
of night. Imarisha narrates that “her wing sliced through two agents in front of her as she
ran toward the trucks. Angels of vengeance have steel for wings, and her remaining
wing had become razor sharp.”142 In this story, Imarisha shares another speculative fic-

140 Ruha Benjamin, “Racial FicAons,” 2.
141Ruha Benjamin, “Racial FicAons.”
142 Walidah Imarisha, “Black Angel,” 51.
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tion, or reimagining of worlds with A, Black angel, as a cyborg with a prosthetic metal
wing who defends her community.

Sondra Perry is an African-Amer-

ican inter-disciplinary artist whose work explores identity and technology. Her 2018 Serpentine exhibition Typhoon coming on blends a variety of high and low-tech technologies with other mediums and forms to construct an interactive experience that involves
participants in the reimagining of narratives relating to the trans-Atlantic slave trade and
consumer capitalism. The exhibition guide quotes the artist, who describes her focus:
“I’m interested in thinking about how blackness shifts, morphs and embodies technology
to combat oppression and surveillance throughout the diaspora. Blackness is agile.”143
These reimaginings of blackness are all alternative ways of imbricating technologies
with bodies that prioritize values of restorative justice through a reclamation of power to
render embodiment. There is a vast juncture between the way embodiment blends within technologies in these alternatives forms and the ways in which artificial intelligence
reproduces the practices of surveillance on black and brown bodies.
Another practice in utopian longings for technology is a collaborative paper titled
“Patching Gender: Non-binary Utopias in HCI.” This piece constructs a series of scenarios, referred to as ‘gender bugs’ which reflect the often-exclusionary terrain of technological design in human-computer interaction. It then may follow up one of these scenarios with a utopian fix. For example, Bug #4 is titled “Liar, liar, gender on fire” and reads
as following:
Gray finds out that the European Union is funding facial recognition technology
that will function as lie detectors on EU borders. As Gray has to cross a border in
and out of the EU every day, she is worried about the implications of gender

143 Sondra Perry, Typhoon coming on, 6 March-20 May 2018 Exhibition Guide.
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recognition in this software, and how that may complicate the chances of changing her legal gender marker to non-binary in the future. Gray criticises this development not only because automated gender recognition and lie detection are unattainable, but also because the product can be used to target the most vulnerable populations.144
For this scenario, there is no utopian fix to a system that takes an essentialist approach
to ‘reading’ or ‘classifying’ gender. This will always be a harm for non-binary people.
These utopian alternatives highlight a disparity between the ways in which ubiquitous practices of artificial intelligence reify oppression of bodies_ and _ the radical
utopian imaginary for bodies in interaction with technologies. Personally, I would rather
hold space for technologies that open, rather than close the world.

144 Keyes, Barlas, Spiel “Patching Gender: Non-binary Utopias in HCI,” 4.
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6. Conclusion
“If we are going to have artificially intelligent programs and robots, I would have sculptors and
visual artists shaping their appearance, musicians composing their voices, choreographers
forming their motion, poets crafting their language, and novelists and dramatists creating their
character and interactions. To ignore these traditions is to discard centuries of experience and
wisdom relevant to the research questions at hand.”145

Whether or not we can have artificial intelligence that is radical and liberatory is something I am very suspicious of. I am not sure we would recognize it if it carried these potentials. AI is increasingly used to monitor, survey, and police normativity and deviance.
However, there are alternatives. Imagine that instead of viewing AI as an abstract and
impressive feat that has been achieved, we move to understand it as just one formulation of technology that is involved in body-making processes. Albeit, a formulation where
abstraction and miniaturization are specific features. Rather than taking an approach of
moral nihilism, AI can be understood as arising out of a sociocultural context wherein
the technoscape is defined by the same systems and structures of power, namely colonization, white supremacy, patriarchy and capitalism. AI is an extremely expensive technology funded for its capacity to privilege the power structures of the system through
which is arises. Accordingly, it is not surprising that AI is used to locate protestors, assist
ICE; automate policing; manipulate people through subtle marketing techniques among
other social implications. We should also not be surprised that AI renders complex personhood via its disproportionate rendering of whiteness and masculinity as accurate
over blackness and femininity. While AI is a massive financed project built through an
145

Stephen Wilson, “Artificial Intelligence Research as Art,” 407.
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architecture of data, this does not mean that it is any more technical nor any less social
than other assemblages of bodies and machines. As long as AI is in the hands of those
in power, it will be employed to further reify and facilitate that power.
AI, unlike the cyborgian bodies imagined and created by Mori or the virtual-marketing tool/robot/avatar @lilmiquela, is abstracted and convoluted so much that it
shrinks away from its own involvement and accountability in body-making. In fact, it is
presented and framed in such immaterial ways that it feels invisible. Digesting bodies
into its black-box reflects the strategic context of the ways that AI is used to image bodies. AI as a broad assemblage of technologies pertains to the topic of embodiment in
that it construes which bodies count as bodies. Like other hybrids that challenge boundaries related to the body, AI—as it is operationalized through facial recognition, automatic gender recognition and machine learning datasets trained on human bodies—renders
selves and bodies through sociotechnical practices that determine who is seen and if
they are seen, why.
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